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This year, the next decennial United States census has begun.
When the results of the new census are released, nearly every state
may be forced to redraw the boundary lines defining its state and
federal legislative districts. The goals and methods a state adopts
for political redistricting pose important policy questions for the
state. The location of the boundary lines will greatly influence the
composition of the legislatures, and the new legislatures will, in
turn, affect the direction of states for years into the future. Since the
U.S. Supreme Court first held political redistricting to bejusticiable
in Baker v. Carr, t redistricting has been constrained by legal deci-
sions defining constitutional requirements for drawing district
lines.2 Political redistricting has thus become a question of law as
well as policy.
Recently, redistricting has also become a new playground for
computers. The improvements in computer technology made dur-
ing the past decade will allow political groups to use computers in
order to construct carefully gerrymandered districting plans; redis-
tricters will be able to draw plans "manually" and use the computer
to measure quickly the political impact such plans would have. 3 As
implied by the term gerrymander, this new use of computers as
"bookkeepers" in redistricting can be expected to produce district
boundaries that directly benefit those drawing the lines and may
strongly decrease the value of many state residents' votes. One can
expect that these new plans, though gerrymandered, will meet the
1. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
2. For example, Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725 (1983), struck down as unconstitu-
tional a plan for NewJersey's U.S. congressional districts because the average deviation
from perfect population equality across districts was 0.1384%. Since Baker, redistricting
plans like the plan in Karcher may be found to violate the equal protection clause, U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
3. New Age of Gerrymandering.. Political Magic by Computer?, N.Y. Times,Jan. 10, 1989, at
Al, col. 5 [hereinafter Age of Gerrymandering]; see also Note, Computer Models and Post-
Bandemer Redistricting, 99 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 1990) (discussing current use of com-
puters in political redistricting).
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population equality standards used by courts in the past to reject
redistricting plans.
This new use of computers in redistricting, along with the 1986
Davis v. Bandemer4 decision holding partisan gerrymandering justici-
able for the first time, should prompt new changes in political redis-
tricting law and policy. In fact, some expect that after the 1990
census, virtually every proposed redistricting plan might be chal-
lenged in the courts. 5
In response to a perceived need for changes in political redistrict-
ing for the future, this Current Topic proposes a new method for
redistricting. Specifically, this Current Topic proposes a new com-
puter model that might be used to automate redistricting. This Cur-
rent Topic does not address the merits of automated redistricting as
such, except to the degree that readers find the logic of automated
redistricting inherently compelling. Instead, it proposes that a par-
ticular, new type of computer algorithm-simulated annealing-be
examined for use in political redistricting.6
The Current Topic will start with the proposition, first advanced
in the 1960's, that automated redistricting models should be used to
create district boundary lines.7 Unlike the manual use of computers
in redistricting, where politicians or their agents draw the political
boundary lines by hand, checking the political or other makeup of
the resulting map using computer databases, 8 automated redistricting
forces line drawers to specify their goals for redistricting in advance,
while the computer program does the actual line drawing. The
goals that might be specified include criteria such as maximizing the
compactness of districts, making districts equal in population, and
4. 478 U.S. 109 (1986) (plurality opinion). In Bandemer, the Supreme Court, in ex-
amining redistricting plans for the state of Indiana, found that it would be possible for a
gerrymander to discriminate unconstitutionally against members of a political party-a
new equal protection argument. The Court did not find that the Indiana plan consti-
tuted an unlawful gerrymander, but the decision cleared the way for a new class of plain-
tiffs to challenge redistricting plans.
5. Age of Gerrymandering, supra note 3.
6. For an extensive discussion of why computer models should be used in redistrict-
ing, see Note, supra note 3.
7. See, e.g., Nagel, Simplified Bipartisan Computer Redistricting, 17 STAN L. REV. 863
(1965); Weaver & Hess, A Procedure for Nonpartisan Districting: Development of Computer Tech-
niques, 73 YALE LJ. 288 (1963); Symposium on Computers & Reapportionment, 2 RUTGERS J.
COMPUTERS TECH. & L. 13 (1971).
8. This is the threatened use of computers indicated in Age of Gerrymandering, supra





maintaining the contiguity of districts. 9 The modelers would also
specify the types of input they were using in the model, such as cen-
sus data and collected political data like the political makeup of city
blocks. Given such input data and a redistricting algorithm, a com-
puter model would then produce a plan for political boundary lines.
Although the notion of automated redistricting was first discussed
more than twenty-five years ago, recent advances in computer
power and algorithm design suggest that radical improvements over
past redistricting algorithms may now be possible. Because auto-
mated redistricting could be an important policy solution to many
redistricting problems, the public must be made aware of the possi-
ble positive uses of computers in redistricting given today's technol-
ogy, before forming irreversible, negative views of computerized
redistricting that may follow from seeing the "computer as book-
keeper" method used to create unsatisfactory, gerrymandered polit-
ical districts. Additionally, if people continue to view automated
redistricting only in terms of dated computer algorithms, they may
never consider automated redistricting to be a viable policy solution
to a difficult problem.
I. Automating Redistricting
A. Terminology
It may be helpful to explain some terminology that must be used
in describing automated redistricting.
1. Algorithms. An algorithm is a step-by-step process defining
exactly how a task is to be accomplished. For example, an algorithm
for opening a door may be: Go to door. Move hand to doorknob.
Grasp doorknob. Turn doorknob clockwise. If this is a "push"
door, then push door open. If this is a "pull" door, then pull door
open. A redistricting algorithm would define the steps telling ex-
actly how to rearrange the information provided to a computer (the
data) into a redistricting plan.
2. Computer Programs. A redistricting algorithm must in turn
be translated into a computer program, consisting of linesoof com-
puter code, that would tell the computer to perform the tasks de-
scribed by the redistricting algorithm. A computer program is a
9. For lists of criteria for political redistricting and definitions, see, e.g., Lijphart,
Comparative Perspectives on Fair Representation: The Plurality-Majority Rule, Geographical Dis-
tricting, and Alternative Electoral Arrangements, in REPRESENTATION AND REDISTRICTING IS-
SUES 145-46 (1982).
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translation of a theoretical idea (an algorithm) into a form usable by
a computer.
3. Computer Models. Finally, think of the overall computer
model as a book: The plot might be comparable to an algorithm, as
in "boy meets girl." The written words on the page are comparable
to a computer program, since they translate the plot (algorithm)
into a form that we (the computer) can read. And the term "com-
puter model" reflects the whole book, bringing to mind not only the
story (algorithm), but also the words (program), and the images
those words create for our imagination (the notion of political redis-
tricting itself, along with possible redistricting plans and concerns).
B. Representing the Redistricting Problem Mathematically
Before proposing a new algorithm for political redistricting, it is
important to clarify mathematically how the process of redistricting
is reduced to a computer model. In general, a computerized redis-
tricting scheme takes an initial redistricting plan as input and im-
proves it using an algorithm, producing a new plan. Input data for
the model will include a list of the smallest "enumeration districts"
(EDs) in a state that can be moved; for example, in a city, an
enumeration district might be a city block. A redistricting program
thus could rearrange collections of city blocks into districts, but a
city block could not be broken into smaller pieces. In sparsely
populated regions, towns or counties might be the enumeration dis-
tricts. Input data would also include a "touchlist," supplied to tell
the program which EDs are neighbors in order to have the model
test for contiguity.' 0
The automated schemes considered here allow the modeler to
choose which criteria, such as population criteria or compactness (a
measure distinguishing snaky districts from, say, round ones),
should be improved. " Most of the potentially desirable criteria for
redistricting can be adapted in a computer model via either the ob-
jective function (such as, "maximize compactness"),' 2 the con-
straints (such as keeping populations equal in districts, and ensuring
that each district is contiguous), the data structure (for example,
treating two neighboring EDs separated by a mountain range as
10. EDs and touchlists are discussed extensively in Weaver & Hess, supra note 7.
11. See Lijphart, supra note 9, for a discussion of possible criteria for redistricting.
12. For example, goals or objective functions might be "Maximize compactness!"
for a redistricting algorithm, or "Start car!" for someone going through the steps re-




noncontiguous),13 or the program structure (establishing what goals
the program will look at and in what order).' 4
As an example of the great flexibility modelers have in designing
an automated redistricting model, consider a simple case. Recall
that the touchlist is an array of numbers that tells the computer pro-
gram which EDs neighbor other EDs. So, for example, if two towns
are neighbors, their touchlist value should be 1, while if they do not
touch, their value should be 0. Just as a touchlist value could be set
at 0 if two towns neighbor but are separated by a river, a touchlist
value could be placed at, say, 0.5 if towns touch but their socioeco-
nomic conditions differ. Inclusion of factors such as these that in-
crease the modeler's control of the results is not meant to suggest
that added control is desirable, but only to show the flexibility that
can be built into a computer model. Adjusting touchlists in this
manner might represent a compromise to make legislators more
amenable to the use of computers. Legislators would still be ac-
countable for their choices because the adjusted touchlists would be
available to the courts and the public. For example, courts could
regulate the redistricting process by finding that certain touchlist
choices represent an unconstitutional intent to gerrymander, or un-
constitutional discrimination.
C. Choosing a Plan
Unlike the "computer as bookkeeper" method, the automated
process suggested here does not allow for human interaction in the
actual redistricting procedure; once an algorithm and the input data
are chosen, a model will produce a single districting plan. Legisla-
tors, and possibly judges, must consider whether to produce a single
plan for immediate implementation, or whether, instead, to run the
model several times using different input data in order to produce
more than one plan from which to choose. If, for example, the re-
sults of an algorithm depend on the initial data, feeding the com-
puter several different initial schemes should produce a set of plans
13. The data structure can essentially be used to tell the computer what information
it can manipulate. This use of the term "data structure" should not necessarily imply
the same connotations that "data structure" ordinarily has in computer science usage.
14. For example, if the goal of redistricting were to create constitutionally sound
districts that were changed as little as possible from previous districts, the program itself
might be designed in such a way as to provide a least changed plan. See Nagel, supra note
7.
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from which to choose.' 5 Or, if a program sequentially examines the
list of EDs when improving districts, running the model after chang-
ing the order of the input should produce different results.' 6
Individuals might prefer to use the computer to produce a set of
alternative plans if they were hesitant to entrust redistricting com-
pletely to a machine. However, to do so arguably would defeat the
purpose of using a computer to redistrict. Allowing politicians to
choose among plans without requiring that they justify their deci-
sions essentially would remove the accountability factor which is the
very strength of computerized redistricting. Politicians could try to
use a computer to "legitimate" gerrymandering; the party in power
could produce plans until it found a desirable scheme; or, if allowed
only a limited number of plans, the majority party could simply
choose the plan most beneficial to it. Likewise, the incumbents
could choose the plan most beneficial to them.
Because it is ultimately desirable to have an automated model
produce a single redistricting plan, it is important that the final plan
be defensible. If the computer model simply chose randomly
among equal population plans, its opponents could argue that the
automated process was really no more rational than the present sys-
tem, and that the only improvement of automation was the removal
of intent to gerrymander. In fact, there are at least two standards
which could be used to defend the computer's selection of a plan-
having the model produce the least changed plan which meets popula-
tion equality,' 7 or claiming that the algorithm's solution is optimal.
Optimality of the solution would seem to be the strongest possi-
ble defense of a computer-generated redistricting plan. However, it
is not clear at first that one can claim that any redistricting solution
is optimal. For example, in any state, many plans exist which satisfy
equality of population in districts, so no plan could be called "opti-
mal" just by virtue of the fact that it met the criterion of population
equality. However, "the more criteria [there are in redistricting],
the fewer the solutions that can satisfy them."' 8 Additional research
15. See, e.g., Weaver & Hess, supra note 7, at 302-04. The Weaver/Hess algorithm
will produce different results for different initial guesses of the location of the popula-
tion centers for districts.
16. See, e.g., Nagel, supra note 7, at 885 ("A simple way of trying to reach the true
[optimal solution] is to run the same set of data cards a few times with the cards ar-
ranged in a different random order each time.").
17. This goal is one of the considerations in the Nagel model. See Nagel, supra note
7, at 894.
18. Papayanopoulos, Quantitative Principles Underlying Apportionment Methods, 219 AN-




might suggest, for example, the existence of a unique optimal solu-
tion for a compact, contiguous, equal population plan in a state.
While the existence of an optimal solution is a function of the crite-
ria the modelers choose to include in the redistricting program, this
avenue seems worthy of additional investigation. 19
D. The Notion of Optimality
The notion of optimality in redistricting might be easier to under-
stand if illustrated by a less complex example. Consider a street full
of potholes. If a child wants her toy to fall as deep into the earth as
possible, she might throw the toy into this street. The toy might roll
or bounce, and end up in one of the potholes. The final resting
place of the toy might be one of the more shallow potholes, in which
case one would call the solution a "local optimum," which is optimal
in the sense that the toy is as deep as it can be anywhere in its imme-
diate neighborhood. Not only is the toy lower than it would be if it
had stayed on the street, but at the bottom of the shallow pothole it
is also deeper than it could be if it got stuck halfway down that pot-
hole. If the child actually succeeded in placing the toy into the
deepest pothole in the street, one would call the result the "global
optimum." In the context of redistricting, a local optimum would be
good, but a global optimum would be defensible as the optimal so-
lution to a problem. The sketch below illustrates the concept of lo-
cal and global optima in political redistricting:
19. Notice that if Nagel's method needs to be adjusted to consider compactness at
the same time as population equality, then the standard of overall optimality of the plan
might be a more appropriate test for Nagel's model than the least changed plan would
be, since it would otherwise not be clear when to stop adjusting compactness. Cf Nagel,
supra note 7, at 885.
Notice, too, that Nagel's use of the least changed plan is one example of creating the
possibility of an optimal solution by establishing the criteria in advance. When the crite-
rion is "changing plan the least," the optimal solution will be the least changed plan.
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An Example of Local versus Global Optima in Political Redistricting








Contiguous, Equal Population Plans
Notice that this example has been simplified. First, it assumes that it
is possible to express the total compactness of a plan with a single
measure by, for example, considering only the sum of compactness in
the plan. The same liberty has been taken with population equality.
This sketch is also simplified in that it represents compactness of dis-
tricts as a continuous and continuously differentiable function. Realis-
tically, the line shown should only be a series of discrete points.
In the pothole example, the algorithm is the procedure making
the toy bounce or roll along the street. In redistricting, the toy is
replaced by an objective function, such as the measure of the dis-
trict's population equality. Measuring population equality alone,
the procedure might end at any one of many equally shallow
"potholes." However, as one adds other criteria, such as compact-
ness, these apparently equal potholes have different depths. For ex-
ample, the objective function might measure compactness as well as
population equality, in which case there may well be a unique opti-
mal solution to the problem.
An important consideration in the use of an automated process to
produce a single redistricting plan is whether an algorithm can actu-
ally locate a defensible, globally optimal plan. 20 One could argue
that an automated process that cannot find a true global optimum
should only be used to produce several plans from which legislators
could choose a districting scheme, because the modeler would not
20. The Weaver/Hess algorithm, for example, suggested a method to find compact,
equal population districts. However, not only was the method unable to test for conti-
guity, but also the integer programming solution used was dependent on the initial in-
put chosen; a computer solution dependent on initial conditions is a characteristic of an




be able to justify the process's otherwise random selection of one
suboptimal plan. 2' If an algorithm could be designed to find a sin-
gle global optimal solution, 22 a completely automated redistricting
procedure might be both justifiable and desirable.
Unfortunately, computerized redistricting represents a very diffi-
cult optimization problem because it is a combinatorics problem.
Combinatorics problems involve rearranging pieces into different
combinations-for example, rearranging EDs into political dis-
tricts.2 3 As one author discussing the combinatorial nature of the
redistricting problem commented:
some of the most elusive problems of mathematical programming are
combinatorial. Until a precise, highly efficient solution method is de-
veloped for a problem of this type, many lesser techniques may be
explored. Some may work under certain circumstances and not under
others. Some may be faster but less accurate than others, and so on.24
With one exception, the techniques developed thus far for polit-
ical redistricting have been unable to find an optimal solution.2 5
The exception, complete enumeration of all possible arrangements
of EDs into districts,2 6 is impossible to use in cases having more
21. However, it might also be reasonable to have the computer automatically choose
a single suboptimal plan if that plan represents the best effort that technology can pres-
ently achieve, subject to time and money constraints. Such a selection could be viewed
using Herbert Simon's notion of"satisficing," which recognizes that while it would often
require too much information to "optimize" real-life situations mathematically, it is still
possible to make good decisions subject to the environmental and informational con-
straints of the decision. See, e.g., H. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR: A STUDY OF DECI-
SION-MAKING PROCESSES IN ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION 240-44, 272 (3d ed. 1976).
22. Given the previous discussion of satisficing, supra note 21, the global optimal for
the purposes of this Current Topic should really be taken to mean the "best optimal"
that can be found using today's technology.
23. Most solvable optimization problems are not combinatoric problems, but instead
are polynomial problems, which are formulations that take a computer on the order of,
say n, or n-squared, or n-raised to the kth power, steps to solve. A combinatorics prob-
lem cannot be described in one of these polynomial forms, and instead usually takes on
the order of some number-raised to the nth power, steps to solve.
In an example of a polynomial problem, if a problem takes n-raised to the second
operations to solve, then for n= 10, the problem might take .001 seconds to solve, and
sextupling n to 60 would raise the time of solution to .036 seconds (.001 * 6-squared).
In contrast, for the simplest nonpolynomial algorithm, taking 2-raised to the n steps to
solve, if n= 10 takes the computer .001 seconds to solve, n=60 would take 366 centu-
ries. See M. GAREY & D. JOHNSON, COMPUTERS AND INTRACTABILITY: A GUIDE TO THE
THEORY OF NP-CoMPLETENESS 6-9 (1979). Garey and Johnson describe a problem as
"intractable if it is so hard that no polynomial time algorithm can possibly solve it." Id. at
8.
24. Papayanopoulos, supra note 18, at 188.
25. See id. at 188-89.
26. See, e.g., PARR, THE EQUALIZER (Apple Version 1.0; IBM Version 1.0. Distributed
by National Collegiate Software Clearinghouse, School of Humanities and Social Sci-
ences, North Carolina State University) (on file with author).
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than approximately 50 EDs because of the explosive nature of com-
binatorics problems; while enumeration might be helpful in redraw-
ing boundaries for town council seats, this method is not promising
for the redistricting of major states.
I. The Proposal.: Simulated Annealing, A State-of-the-Art Technique
While former computer models have not been able to find defen-
sible, optimal redistricting solutions, a recently practicable com-
puter technique called simulated annealing may be well suited for
solving the political redistricting problem. In science, annealing de-
scribes the way in which hot metal is cooled slowly, allowing mole-
cules to arrange themselves into a stable, low-energy configuration.
Metal cooled in this way is stronger than metal which is cooled
quickly, trapping molecules in high-energy, less stable configura-
tions. Simulated annealing offers computer scientists an opportunity
to use this principle of slow cooling to find the optimal solutions to
complex problems. In the pothole example, annealing would en-
able an automated toy to move along the street in a pattern more
likely to help it find the deepest pothole. Simulated annealing sim-
ply describes a different algorithm for solving mathematical
problems. As a 1986 text commented, "[t]he method of simulated
annealing is a technique that has recently attracted significant atten-
tion as suitable for optimization problems of very large scale." 27
The details of annealing are somewhat beyond the scope of this
discussion. In summary, however, if one starts with any random
configuration of a system (for example, think of the current redis-
tricting plan for a state as the initial configuration) and then tries to
change random pieces of the system (for example, moving groups of
EDs between legislative districts), always keeping changes that im-
prove the system (for example, making districts closer in equality of
population), and occasionally keeping changes which harm the sys-
tem (for example, making districts less equal in population), then
eventually one should reach an optimal or nearly optimal configura-
tion of the system (a plan that meets the objective function, such as
the most compact plan).28
27. W. PRESS, B. FLANNERY, S. TEUKOLSKY & W. VETrERLING, NUMERICAL RECIPES:
THE ART OF SCIENTIFIC COMPUTING 326 (1986) [hereinafter PRESS] (emphasis omitted).
28. For an excellent description of annealing with examples, see PRESS, supra note
27, at 326-34. In order to understand the power of the annealing technique, it is impor-
tant to note that the problem on which Press demonstrates annealing is an example of a
difficult nonpolynomial problem. See discussion and definition of nonpolynomial




This technique's emphasis on randomization should produce a
plan that is independent of the initial conditions chosen. As a clas-
sic text on numerical methods explains, annealing is designed to
overcome the shortcomings of most optimization techniques, which
"[go] greedily for the quick, nearby solution ... [leading] to a local,
but not necessarily a global, minimum." 29
To apply simulated annealing and optimization to the redistrict-
ing problem, one must first consider the initial configuration and
"energy" aspects of the model. Initially, one would assign the EDs
in the state to districts according to the current map. The "energy"
of this system might be defined as:
Energy = Compactness + Contiguity + Population Equality3o
The goal is to minimize the energy of the system, just as the mole-
cules in annealing metal try to reach their minimum energy config-
uration. Energy in this sense is essentially another name for an
objective function. Notice that the formulation of this objective
function using selected criteria was chosen only as an example.
Again, most criteria of interest in redistricting can be included in
some aspect of the model.31 Notice, too, that one can minimize en-
ergy in order to either minimize or maximize terms in the model,
because minimizing any value is the same as maximizing the exact
opposite of that value. Maximization and minimization are to this
degree interchangeable.
One can view the model above as an optimization of compactness,
with the other terms included in the equation as a "relaxation" of a
29. PRESS, supra note 27, at 327. Most optimizing algorithms, trying to reach the
"quick, nearby solution," are analogous to the example in real annealing in which metal
is cooled quickly, leaving molecules in a suboptimal configuration.
30. Expressed mathematically,
k
Energy = 7 1 populationj (distance from center ofj to population-center of i)2 +
districts EDS
i=l jEi
k 0 fititi otgosk!
Y 0if dIt ise tiguous 1 ( I populationi ) -- (total state population)
districts herwise districts EDS K
i- I i=1 jEi
Notice that this is only one formulation of the redistricting problem into a mathematical
model. Computer modeling is an extremely flexible form. See supra Section I.B. A
model could include additional terms that are different from these, such as a term
designed to protect incumbents; a model could also use different representations of in-
cluded terms, such as a different measure of compactness, say, to maximize the compact-
ness of the least compact district, as opposed to a measure like the current one designed
to maximize the average compactness.
31. See supra Section I.B.
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constrained optimization problem. Relaxation provides a means of
solving a constrained problem as an unconstrained one, by allowing
one to bring the constraints of the problem into the objective func-
tion. In this example, it is the requirements of equal population and
contiguity which provide constraints on the otherwise uncon-
strained problem of maximizing compactness of districts. A simple,
real-world problem, while not completely analogous, may explain
the notion of relaxation. Consider a student in a cafeteria line with
a simple objective function: Maximize food intake. He may think of
this objective as a need to pile as much food onto his tray as possi-
ble. However, the student may be under a constraint: He must leave
room for a tasty dessert. The student now has a constrained op-
timization problem. He must pile as muc'h food on his tray as possi-
ble, but he knows in the back of his mind that he must leave room
for dessert. Our student may simplify this problem by relaxing it:
The student can draw a line on his tray, so that one quarter of his
tray is left clear for desserts, and the remaining portion of his tray is
free to be piled with food. The student has then created an uncon-
strained optimization problem. He will pile as much food onto the
remaining three-quarters of the tray as he wants, without worrying
about his constraint, since he has "absorbed" the constraint into the
objective function. This can be thought of as a relaxation.
Because redistricting represents a discrete, 32 constrained, 33 non-
linear,34 multiattribute problem, 35 and because simulated annealing
works well on discrete, nonlinear, multiattribute problems, simu-
lated annealing should be able to handle redistricting using the re-
formulation provided here. By absorbing constraints such as
population equality and contiguity into the objective function, the
relaxation allows one to solve an unconstrained optimization that is,
as a rule, much easier to solve than a constrained optimization prob-
lem. The constraints are absorbed by bringing them into the energy
equation with weights or multipliers3 6 that determine how much the
32. Discrete, that is, as opposed to continuous. EDs are building blocks that are
whole entities and must be treated as discrete entities.
33. Constrained because the Court requires districts to be of equal population.
34. Nonlinear because, for example, two EDs do not necessarily have twice the pop-
ulation and twice the size of a single ED.
35. Multiattribute because the problem has multiple goals. See Lijphart, supra note 9.
36. Here the multipliers are the lambda terms in the previous equation, supra note
30. These multipliers help the relaxation. For example, in the cafeteria example, the
student set aside one quarter of his cafeteria tray for dessert. But he could just have
easily set aside a half or an eighth of the tray for dessert. Although an extensive discus-




energy term is penalized when the constraint is not met; the multi-
pliers should be chosen to force the program to meet the
constraints. 3 7
The main portion of the annealing process will choose EDs at ran-
dom and change their districting assignments, either swapping EDs
or moving single EDs.3 8 If the new assignment leads to a lowering
of the energy of the system, the districting assignments will be up-
dated. If the new assignment raises the energy of the system, the
change may or may not be implemented. After the process runs for
a long time, the system should reach a relatively stable condition.
When annealing is finally stopped, the districting assignments
should represent a defensible optimal or nearly optimal
configuration.
III. Policy Choices and the Formulation of the Model
Notice that the construction of the model leaves to the modeler
many choices. Designers choose not only the criteria to be consid-
ered in the model, but also the multipliers or weights in the equa-
tion that might be used to represent a tradeoff between different
objectives. They can also choose the formulation of the objective
function in another sense: an objective function may use, for exam-
ple, a utilitarian formulation of compactness, representing compact-
ness of the model in terms of the total compactness of the system;39
compactness may instead, however, be represented using a Rawlsian
approach, in which the goal would be to maximize the compactness
cartoonish real world example you might think of the multiplier as the fraction of space
set aside for the dessert.
True Lagrangian multipliers would allow a computer to find the optimal amount of
space to leave for desserts, so that it could maximize its objective function and meet its
constraints: the fraction would not be fixed in advance. An automated redistricting
model, however, might need to use weights instead of true Lagrangian multipliers. That
is, the model designers would specify in advance the "portion of the tray" to be set aside
for each goal, such as compactness and contiguity. The need to use weights in computer
redistricting models has long been recognized. See, e.g., Torricelli & Porter, Toward the
1980 Census: The Reapportionment of New Jersey's Congressional Districts, 7 RUTGERS J. COM-
PUTERS, TECH. & L. 135, 155 (1979).
37. In multiattribute annealing problems, these weighting choices are usually made
empirically. See, e.g., Koch, Marroquin & Yuille, Analog "Neuronal" Networks in Early Vi-
sion, 83 Proc. Nat'l. Acad. Sci. U.S. 4263, 4265 (1986) (finding weights in multiobjective
vision application); Marroquin, Surface Reconstruction Preserving Discontinuities 11 (M.I.T.
Artificial Intelligence Lab Memo No. 792, 1984) (using empirical testing to select values
for parameters used in annealing application in image processing). Although the
choices used may be made empirically in the redistricting case, this does not mean that
the choices may be arbitrary.
38. This is similar to the Nagel model. See Nagel, supra note 7.
39. See, e.g., objective function supra note 30. The measure used in that equation is
that prescribed in Weaver & Hess, supra note 7, at 296-300.
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of the least compact district. 40 Such a Rawlsian/utilitarian choice is
present in the selection of other factors as well, such as population
equality. Annealing has no consistency requirement mandating that
the same type of formulation be made for each term. The model
allows yet another choice in the measure of criteria chosen. For ex-
ample, a formulation may use any one of a number of measures of
compactness. 4 ' Still another choice may be made in the adjustment
of touchlist values, if such changes are allowed.
If automation of the redistricting process should be a legislative
function, then legislators will, in fact, have a chance to influence the
results of the model through their choices. However, automating
the process leaves the legislators accountable to both the public and
the courts in their selections. 42 Because any chosen model may be
subjected to court and public review, legislators will have an incen-
tive to work with experts in redistricting to choose supportable
terms and measures. For example, the modelers may have to de-
fend the terms they used, such as the reasonableness of including or
excluding a measure of compactness. The modelers might also have
to defend their choice of a Rawlsian versus utilitarian measure of
variables such as population equality or compactness.
Some observers may even scrutinize formulations of factors like
compactness. For example, although the Court might simply want
to see compactness in districting,4 3 it is not clear that just any mea-
sure of compactness should be used by designers. It is possible to
design compactness measures that are defensible from both a scien-
tific standpoint4 4 and a logical perspective. 4 5 Since compactness is a
40. In mathematical terms, that might be:
Min Max I populationj (distance from center ofj to population center of i)2
districts i EDS
jEi
41. Combinations of criteria could be used as well. One may, for example, design an
objective function under which the solution would not measure poorly under any of
several compactness measures, even though that configuration would not be a unique
optimal under any single measure of compactness. The same steps could also be taken
for criteria other than compactness.
42. See generally Note, supra note 3.
43. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 167 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part).
44. See description in Weaver & Hess, supra note 7, at 296-300.
45. For example, the Weaver & Hess measure, described at id., makes sense largely
because it maintains compactness as a relative rather than an absolute measure. Using
the Weaver/Hess measure, one can say that District A is more compact than District B,
but one cannot say that District A is compact. Unless a district consists of a single per-
son in a single point, it logically does not make sense to be able to say that a district is





new area of research, 46 and it may be measured in many different
forms, 4 7 any measure might be suspect unless it can be clearly de-
fended by the modelers.
It is perhaps more likely that courts might simply require design-
ers to show that the selections made were not purely arbitrary.
However, even in that instance, legislators might hesitate before
making particularly poor or "unfair" choices that could irritate the
voting public, the courts, or their political rivals who have an incen-
tive to scrutinize redistricting models and make their impressions
known. While legislators might try to use proxies to conceal inap-
propriate choices, disclosure of the model design process succeeds
in safeguarding the public to a large degree.48
The multipliers used to trade off the terms in the objective func-
tion will also affect the outcome of the redistricting process. Empiri-
cal research is needed to test the sensitivity of the terms;4 9 for
example, one might expect that as long as the multiplier of popula-
tion equality lies in a certain range, the results should also lie in a
range that meets court standards. Because an increase in the
number of terms considered in the model will make it more difficult
for an automated process to meet all goals, 50 it is reasonable to ex-
pect legislators first to create a model striving for only those fea-
tures, such as population equality, contiguity, and compactness, that
the Court has suggested, and later explore the use of additional,
more political terms, such as those that would protect incumbents.
Legislators must consider, though, that the use of a computer model
in redistricting makes their choices highly visible. While modelers
could, for example, include features in the program that would keep
incumbents in separate districts, ostensibly at the expense of reach-
ing some other goal, constituents might protest if they felt their
political choices were being manipulated.
46. See, e.g., Hofeller & Grofman, Comparing the Compactness of California Con-
gressional Districts under Three Different Plans: 1980, 1982, and 1984 (1987) (unpub-
lished manuscript); Niemi & Wilkerson, Compactness and the 1980s Districts in the
Indiana State House: Evidence of Political Gerrymandering? (unpublished manuscript).
47. For example, measures include "the ratio of the district area to the area of the
smallest circle which contains (circumscribes) the district;... the ratio of the district area
to the area of the circle whose circumference is identical to the district perimeter . ."
and "the ratio between the population of each district and the population of the area
inside the polygon with the shortest possible perimeter length which completely sur-
rounds the district." Hofeller & Grofman, supra note 46, at 3-4.
48. For a further discussion of these ideas, see generally Note, supra note 3.
49. See sources cited supra note 37.
50. See supra text accompanying note 18.
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IV. Conclusion
Obviously, a great deal of research still must be done before im-
plementing an automated redistricting scheme. However, the tech-
nique of simulated annealing is a promising solution to the
redistricting problem. The development of a simulated annealing
model for political redistricting could potentially eliminate the
lengthy litigation and uncertainty now surrounding redistricting.
An automated model, once developed, could be used every ten
years to redistrict states quickly after each census. Moreover, having
a fixed, legally acceptable method of automatic redistricting could
eliminate the threat that the continuing crisis over redistricting
poses to the legitimacy of our government. 5'
Unfortunately, it is impossible to eliminate some of the problems
remaining in developing simulated annealing as an automated redis-
tricting scheme. Most notably, choosing the weights for a multiat-
tribute problem (the energy equation) may cause problems if
weights can be chosen only empirically. 52 Also, battles over the
structure of the program and the input data used could rival current
lengthy court battles over political redistricting results. However,
once an automated computer model is developed, and the chal-
lenges to its development have been addressed, that model may be
used in subsequent redistricting efforts, avoiding the necessity of
going through this battle every ten years. Once a model is devel-
oped, automated redistricting should prove very efficient in terms of
human hours consumed.
It would be worthwhile for groups such as the Republican and
Democratic National Committees and political action groups ac-
tively involved in redistricting to examine further the possibilities of
computer modeling and simulated annealing, since a concentrated
effort in this area might produce redistricting plans that could pass
court review. The implementation of computerized redistricting
could also ultimately save time and effort for legislators and judges,
while improving the quality of political representation. As Holmes
suggested years ago, "very likely it may be that with all the help that
statistics and every modern appliance can bring us there never will
51. The present threat stems largely from concern over the extraordinarily high re-
election rate of incumbents. See, e.g., Rosenbaum, It's a House of the Same Representatives,
N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1988, at El, col. 1 (citing reelection rate as high as 98% in 1986).
Although this reelection rate is partially attributable to campaign finances, one cannot
eliminate redistricting as one of the causes of low turnover.




be a commonwealth in which science is everywhere supreme. But it
is an ideal, and without ideals what is life worth?" 53
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53. Holmes, Law in Science and Science in Law, 12 HARV. L. REV. 443, 462 (1899).
